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FINANCIALISATION AND REAL INVESTMENT IN EUROPEAN UNION: 
BENEFICIAL OR PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper makes an empirical assessment of the relationship between financialisation 
and real investment by non-financial corporations using panel data composed of 27 European 
Union countries over 19 years (from 1995 to 2013). On the one hand, financialisation leads to a 
rise in financial investments, diverting funds from real investments (‘crowding out’ effect); on 
the other, pressures from shareholders to intensify financial payments restrict the funds 
available for new real investments. We estimate an aggregate investment equation with the 
traditional variables (lagged investment, profitability, debt, cost of capital, corporate savings 
and output growth) and two further measures of financialisation (financial receipts and financial 
payments). Findings show that financialisation has damaged real investment in European Union 
countries, mainly through the channel of financial payments, either by interest or dividends 
payments. It is also found that the prejudicial effects of financialisation on investment are worse 
in the pre-crisis period. In addition, it is concluded that financialisation contributed to a 
slowdown of real investment by around one per cent and eight per cent in the full and pre-crisis 
period, respectively. During the pre-crisis period, financialisation was the main driver for the 
slowdown of investment in European Union.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Conventional economic theory finds that the growth of finance fosters economic growth 
due to the positive association between savings and investments (e.g. Levine, 2005). 
Nevertheless, scholars of financialisation (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; Hein and van Treeck, 
2010; Hein, 2012; Hein and Dodig, 2015; among others) postulate that the increasing growth of 
finance harms the real investment of non-financial corporations (NFCs) through two channels. 
The first channel involves the NFCs’ greater engagement in financial activities, which tends to 
divert funds from real investments (‘crowding out’ effect). The second is caused by the strong 
pressures on NFCs to increase their financial payments (interest, dividends and/or stock 
buybacks) to the financial markets and respective shareholders, which leads to lower retention 
ratios and fewer funds for long-term productive projects.  
In light of this, some empirical studies have been conducted in recent years to assess the 
relationship between financialisation and real investment. Most of these derive and estimate 
investment equations that find statistical evidence of the prejudicial effects of the phenomenon 
on real investment (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; van Treeck, 2008; 
Onaran et al., 2011; Tori and Onaran, 2015; and Barradas and Lagoa, 2017).  
This paper examines the impact of financialisation on the real investment of NFCs in 
European Union (EU) countries between 1995 and 2013 inclusive, contributing to the literature 
in two new ways. Firstly, it focuses on EU countries, whereas most studies are oriented to the 
specificities of large, highly developed and financialised countries like the USA or the UK. 
Secondly, a panel data econometric analysis is used rather than the time series econometric 
analysis more usual in empirical studies on this matter. This allows us to understand whether the 
prejudicial effects of financialisation have been generalised and are transversal to a large set of 
countries or, alternatively, are specific to certain countries. The use of a panel data econometric 
analysis also permits a higher number of observations, sample variability and less collinearity, 
and thus improves the accuracy and reliability of estimates.  
EU countries represent an interesting case study as they share common economic rules 
because they belong to the same economic and political region. However, these countries have 
some diversity in terms of financialisation, probably due to their different types of financial 
system (‘market based’ or ‘bank-based’, in the typology of Sawyer, 2013), distinct growth 
models in the era of financialisation (‘debt-led consumption boom’, ‘domestic demand-led’ and 
‘export-led mercantilist’, in the classification of Hein, 2012) and diverse models/varieties of 
capitalism (‘liberal market economies’, ‘coordinated market economies’, ‘hybrid/mixed market 
economies’ and ‘transition economies’, in the spirit of Hall and Soskice, 2001; and other related 
works in the field of comparative political economy). These dissimilarities could explain the 
differences in the countries’ levels of financialisation (Figure A7 and Figure A8 in Appendix). 
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Despite this heterogeneity, there has been a downward trend in the investment rate in most of 
these countries (Figure A1 in Appendix), concurrent with a rise in financial receipts and 
financial payments (Figure A7 and Figure A8 in Appendix). It is therefore interesting to 
determine whether there is a disruptive relationship between financialisation and real investment 
and to what extent the increase of both financial receipts and financial payments have 
contributed to the slowdown of real investment.  
Accordingly, we estimate an investment equation using standard variables (lagged 
investment, profitability, debt, cost of capital, corporate savings and output growth) and two 
additional variables linked to financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments). We 
estimate an aggregate investment function given our interest in studying a macroeconomic 
issue. 
It is concluded that financialisation exerts a negative influence on the real investment of 
EU countries, mainly through the second channel and especially in the pre-crisis period. This 
confirms our suspicion that the disruptive relationship between financialisation and real 
investment is a generalised phenomenon with a negative effect on EU countries from a 
macroeconomic point of view. It is also found that these negative effects of financialisation on 
real investment are worse in the pre-crisis period. During the pre-crisis period, financialisation 
was the main driver for the slowdown of investment in EU. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between financialisation and real 
investment of NFCs. An investment equation is built in Section 3. The data and the econometric 
methodology are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main findings and the respective 
discussion. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIALISATION AND REAL 
INVESTMENT 
 
It is generally accepted that higher rates of physical capital accumulation are crucial to 
sustain more dynamic economic growth and employment creation (Orhangazi, 2008a and 
2008b). Conventional economic theory advocates that the growth of finance is generally a 
positive phenomenon that supports the real investments of NFCs given the linkage between 
savings and investments. This idea has been reinforced by some empirical studies, which find a 
positive relationship between the growth of finance and economic growth (Levine, 2005; Ang, 
2008; Arestis et al., 2015). 
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	 Nonetheless, the strong growth of finance in the last three decades has cast doubts on 
the ‘finance-growth nexus’. Empirical studies confirm a decrease or even a reversal in the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth (Kose et al., 2006; Prasad et 
al., 2007; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Barajas et al., 2013; 
Dabla-Norris and Srivisal, 2013; and Beck et al., 2014). These authors recognise that the size of 
the financial sector has an inverted U-shaped effect on economic growth. This means that, from 
a certain threshold, a further enlargement of the financial sector can reduce real economic 
growth.  
Against this backdrop and according to the literature on financialisation, framed in the 
post-Keynesian tradition, the growth of finance can be prejudicial to the real investments of 
NFCs through two distinct channels, as is theoretically discussed by Orhangazi (2008a and 
2008b), Hein and van Treeck (2010), Hein (2012), Hein and Dodig (2015), among others. 
Figure 1 exhibits the channels (and factors that contribute to feed each of them) associated with 
the effects of financialisation on real investment.1 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The first channel involves NFCs’ increasing investment in financial activities and 
financial assets, which takes funds from real and productive activities. This is labelled by Hein 
(2012) and Hein and Dodig (2015) as the ‘management’s preference channel’. As both external 
and internal funds are limited, NFCs can only use these funds to invest in financial or real 
activities, since financial investments and real investments are considered perfect substitutes 
(Tobin, 1965). Thus, NFCs have fewer funds for real and productive investments when they 
increase their financial investments, and this is commonly referred to as the ‘crowding out’ 
effect on real investment. 
Krippner (2005) confirms that NFCs in the USA have increased their involvement in 
financial investments, as revealed by the growing importance of financial revenues and profits 
vis-à-vis the revenues and profits from real investments. Similarly, Cingolani (2013) argues that 
this behaviour expresses a higher accumulation of financial assets to the detriment of productive 
accumulation. In that sense, Botta et al. (2015) build a new monetary circuit taking into account 
the real financial macroeconomic interactions in the financialised era, namely incorporating the 
increasing acquisition of financial assets by NFCs. The literature on financialisation offers 
several explanations to describe this stance by NFCs.  
																																								 																				
1 This argument is not supported by several authors within the Marxian literature (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2009; 
and Kliman and Williams, 2014). They stress that there is a reversed causality, in a context where 
financialisation should be interpreted as the consequence and not the cause of the slowdown of real 
investment of NFCs. Kliman and Williams (2014), for instance, show that the decline of the capital 
accumulation in US corporations is essentially explained by the fall in profitability rather than a diversion of 
profits from productive investments to financial investments and/or financial payments.  	
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Firstly, Crotty (2005) advocates that the rise in financial investments (normally in the 
form of buying financial subsidiaries or expanding an already existing one) has been determined 
by NFCs’ shorter planning horizons which are incompatible with the pursuit of long-term real 
projects. This short-termism mirrors a tendency among investors to sacrifice long-term 
investment projects in order to increase short-term profits (Aspara et al., 2014). According to 
Samuel (2000), this focus on short-term profits instead of long-term expansion reflects a certain 
‘managerial myopia’. 
Secondly, Crotty (1990) concludes that shareholders are more concerned about current 
profitability than long-term expansion or, ultimately, the corporations’ actual survival. 
Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) stresses the strong pressures (essentially exerted by shareholders) 
on managers to achieve higher short-term returns. These pressures encourage financial 
investments, which tend to produce larger and more speculative short-term profits rather than 
real investments that normally involve more uncertainty and only produce profits in the medium 
and long-term. This is the so-called ‘rent-seeking behaviour’ of NFCs. In fact, Hein (2012) and 
Hein and Dodig (2015) stress that NFCs face a ‘growth-profit trade-off’ because shareholders’ 
orientations are mainly for short-term profitability. Once again, this discourages the 
implementation of real capital projects. Baud and Durand (2012) also state that NFCs intensify 
their financial investments during bull markets which produce higher levels of profit and 
respond to the pressures of shareholders. Levy-Orlik (2012) notes that NFCs sometimes 
repurchase their own shares in order to prevent hostile takeovers, which also leads to a rise in 
share prices and increases short-term profits. Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015) even stress that 
managers’ performance is no longer evaluated in terms of market share but rather according to 
their ability to generate short-term profits and increased share prices. 
Thirdly, Crotty (2005) and Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) argue that NFCs may be 
engaging more in financial activities in reaction to the downward trend of profits from the real 
sector and the increase in external funding costs since the 1980s. Baud and Durand (2012) 
confirm that US retailers’ involvement in financial activities is the result of the decline in 
profitable opportunities in real investments, motivated by the maturation of markets, low 
profitability rates, stricter regulations, sluggish consumer demand and increasing competition. 
Soener (2015) notes that this is the political economy perspective in which NFCs are becoming 
more financialised so as to remain viable. Crotty (2005) terms this the ‘neoliberal paradox’; he 
claims that shareholders tend to coerce NFCs to remain competitive and profitable even in 
downturn environments, thus inducing managers to move from productive to financial 
investments. According to Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), this behaviour reflects the NFCs 
strategy of ‘fast growth in a slow-growth economy’.  
Fourthly, Akkemik and Özen (2014) advocate that macroeconomic uncertainty and 
increased risks, together with institutional changes in corporate governance, are the main 
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reasons behind the rise in financial investments by NFCs. They tested these hypotheses using a 
panel data econometric analysis for 41 corporations quoted in the Istanbul Stock Exchange for 
the period between 1990 and 2002. However, they found this channel to be mainly determined 
by highly uncertain macroeconomic environments and by the characteristics of corporations 
(such as dimension), whilst institutional features (e.g. close ties with the government, family 
ownership, discretion of managerial power and unionisation) do not have a statistically 
significant impact on financialisation. In fact, Baud and Durand (2012) stress that there is a 
greater preference for liquid assets in business environments characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty, as the financial investments of NFCs represent a kind of ‘wait-and-see’ strategy. In 
turn, NFCs involve themselves in financial activities through financial instruments which hedge 
several risks against uncertainty (Soener, 2015). 
Following a neo-institutionalism perspective, Soener (2015) adds two further 
explanations to describe the growing importance of NFCs’ financial investments. Firstly, he 
stresses that NFCs learn to financialise with other corporations – i.e. so-called ‘mimetic 
behaviour’. Secondly, he emphasises that some actors (like financial executives or independent 
consultants) influence investors and managers to make more financial investments. Here, there 
is an institutional transmission of knowledge and practice from the know-how of these actors in 
the corporate finance field to the respective investors and managers. 
Nonetheless, some authors (Fazzari et al., 1988; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; 
Ndikumana, 1999; among others) emphasise that the increase in financial receipts due to 
investments in financial activities and financial assets could exert a positive influence on 
productive investments if (and when) NFCs channel these financial incomes to make real 
investments. Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) recognises that this could be a more relevant 
mechanism in the case of small and medium-sized corporations since they face higher financial 
constraints and are therefore forced to use all incomes (even financial) to undertake real 
investments. The same argument is presented by Tori and Onaran (2015), who stress that the 
effect of financial receipts on investment depends on the NFCs’ dimension and/or sector. 
Accordingly, it exerts a negative influence in the case of large NFCs because they re-invest 
these financial incomes in other financial investments, but it has a positive influence in the case 
of small and medium-sized corporations because they are more likely to be financially 
constrained.  
The second channel is associated with the strong pressures on NFCs to increase their 
financial payments (interest, dividends and/or stock buybacks) to the financial markets and the 
respective shareholders. This limits the funds available for real investments, which is commonly 
referred to as the ‘profit without investment’ hypothesis (Stockhammer, 2005; and Cordonnier 
and Van de Velde, 2014). According to Stockhammer (2005), this hypothesis represents a 
stylized fact in the neoliberal era after the mid-1980s, reflecting a trend of lower investment and 
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output growth along with higher profits due to the increasing shareholder power. As noted by 
Aglietta and Breton (2001) and Duménil and Lévy (2004), the higher levels of payout ratios 
reduce the funds available for real investments made by NFCs, which has had a negative effect 
on the execution of long-term investment projects including activities like innovation, research 
and development. Hein (2012) and Hein and Dodig (2015) term this the ‘internal means of 
finance channel’. Once again, the literature on financialisation presents several explanations for 
the low retention ratios of NFCs. 
Firstly, Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) focuses on the high levels of NFCs’ indebtedness, 
which lead to a rise in financial payments in the form of interest.  
Secondly, and regarding the financial payments through dividends, the author notes that 
managers are encouraged to raise short-term payout ratios and it is in fact in their interest to do 
so as their remuneration is based on the short-term evolution of stock prices. Their strategy is 
therefore to distribute high dividends, because this tends to drive a short-term increase in stock 
prices. On the other hand, this is simply a response to pressures from shareholders who, in some 
cases, are institutional investors that seek constant appreciations in stock value and high payout 
ratios. If NFCs do not make these financial payments in the form of dividends, their stocks 
could decline sharply, as demand for them would fall and supply increase, which could 
ultimately lead to a takeover.  
 Thirdly, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Stockhammer (2010) argue that this 
growing trend in financial payments by NFCs over the last three decades is associated with a 
new design of corporate governance that favours the maximisation of shareholder value: the so-
called ‘shareholder value orientation’. Aglietta (2000) and van der Zwan (2014) note that this 
has become ‘the norm of the transformation of capitalism’ and is responsible for the 
dissemination of policies and practices that tend to favour shareholders over the other 
constituents of corporations. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) suggest there has been a shift 
from ‘retain and reinvest’ to a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy – that  is to say, a transfer from 
a strategy oriented to towards profit retention and reinvestment in corporations’ growth to one 
of downsizing of corporate labour forces and the distribution of profits to shareholders. Levy-
Orlik (2012) emphasises that investors’ decisions based exclusively on the aim of maximising 
shareholder value target the reduction of production costs and increase in stock prices to the 
detriment of employment, income equality, innovation and industrialisation. 
Conversely, and as referred by Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b), some authors claim that 
the increase in financial payments could be positive for NFCs’ real investment on the grounds 
that higher levels of financial payments depend on higher profits and solvency. As such, these 
corporations will probably have access to more funding at lower costs, which could increase the 
implementation of new productive investments. However, this has not been confirmed 
empirically (e.g. Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; Van Treeck, 2008; Onaran et al., 2011; Tori and 
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Onaran, 2015; and Barradas and Lagoa, 2017), probably because those pressures to raise short-
term financial payments are so strong and constant that NFCs cannot implement new real 
investments.  
Despite the growing body of theoretical work on the effects of financialisation on real 
investment, there are few empirical studies on the subject, as emphasised by Onaran et al. 
(2011). Nevertheless, some empirical studies estimate investment functions for several countries 
in order to make an econometric analysis of financialisation’s impact on real investment; most 
of these find it to be harmful.2  
Stockhammer (2004) estimates an investment equation for Germany, France, the UK 
and the USA, using a time series econometric analysis for each country individually. He uses 
interest and dividends received (the so-called rentier income) by NFCs to measure 
financialisation, and concludes that it has led to a deceleration in real investment, particularly in 
the USA and the UK. In the case of the UK, the negative effect is more modest, particularly 
because there has not been a decline in accumulation due to the low accumulation rates in the 
last decades. The insignificant effect in Germany is explained by the recent nature of the 
‘shareholder value orientation’ phenomenon in this country. Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b) also 
identifies the deleterious effect of financialisation in the USA. He conducts a time series 
econometric analysis using aggregate data for NFCs as a whole from 1961 and 2004 and a panel 
data econometric analysis using micro-data from 1973 and 2003, analysing by sector 
(manufacturing versus non-manufacturing corporations), industry (durable versus non-durable 
producers) and dimension (small versus large corporations). In both studies, he applies financial 
profits (interest and dividends) and financial payments (interest, dividends and stock buybacks) 
to measure the two channels of financialisation. He finds a negative relationship between these 
two channels and investment in both studies. Van Treeck (2008) also performs a time series 
econometric analysis for the USA for the period between 1965 and 2004. He concludes that 
interest and dividend payments exert a negative influence on long-term non-financial 
investment in the USA. Onaran et al. (2011) estimate an investment function using a time series 
econometric analysis for the USA from 1960 to 2007. They found evidence supporting the 
claims that financialisation (proxied by interest and dividends payments) has suppressed the 
level of investment. Tori and Onaran (2015) analyse the effect of financialisation on physical 
investment in the UK, using micro-data at the corporation level from 1985 to 2013. They find 
evidence supporting the claims that financialisation exerts a negative influence on physical 
investment through financial receipts and financial payments. Barradas and Lagoa (2017) also 
perform a time series econometric analysis focused on Portugal from 1977 and 2013, using a 
																																								 																				
2 As demonstrated by Onaran et al. (2011), there are also some theoretical and empirical studies on the 
effects of financialisation on the other components of the aggregate demand. Here, we focus only on 
investment.	
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vector error correction model and financial receipts and financial profits of NFCs as proxies to 
capture financialisation. They conclude that financialisation has hurt real investment, mainly 
through financial payments and particularly in the long-term. 
The literature has focused mainly on large and highly developed countries through time 
series econometric analyses. Here, we aim to make an empirical assessment of the relationship 
between financialisation and real investment of NFCs using a large set of countries, EU 
countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper conducting a panel data 
econometric analysis for a group of countries over time about financialisation and real 
investment. This approach will allow us to perceive if the prejudicial effects of financialisation 
have been generalised and are transversal to this large set of countries or if they only affected 
specific countries from a macroeconomic view point.3 
 
 
3. FINANCIALISATION AND REAL INVESTMENT: 
AN ECONOMIC MODELISATION 
 
Empirical studies of real investment are particularly difficult when they are carried out 
through econometric estimations of investment functions (Eisner, 1974). Effectively, ‘[…] 
estimation of investment functions is a tricky and difficult business and the best posture for any 
of us in that game is one of humility’ (Eisner, 1974, p. 101). In the same vein, Davidson (2000) 
emphasises that investment equations do not follow a stable functional expression over time, 
since investment decisions are constantly affected by exogenous ‘animal spirits’ of investors. 
Nevertheless, there are several theoretical and empirical studies of real investment in the 
literature that reveal the main determinants of investment decisions. Chirinko (1993) and 
Kopcke and Braunman (2001) surveyed the traditional literature on this issue, identifying 
essentially five determinants of investment: the level of profitability, the degree of indebtedness, 
the cost of capital (or interest rates), cash-flow (or internal funds) and output (or sales).  
In what follows, we estimate an equation where investment is a function of the 
prevalent variables in the explanation of investment decisions of investors in NFCs: lagged 
investment, profitability, level of debt, cost of capital, corporate savings and output growth. 
Additionally, we incorporate two further variables (financial receipts and financial payments) to 
account for the two channels related to financialisation’s prejudicial effects on productive 
investments, as described previously. 
																																								 																				
3 From an econometric view point, the panel data econometric analysis has several other advantages over 
a simple time series econometric analysis, as pointed out by Baltagi (2005), Brooks (2008), among others. 
The majority of these advantages are directly related to the possibility of collecting a higher number of 
observations with more variability and less collinearity, which tends to improve the accuracy and the 
reliability of estimates. 	
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Accordingly, our investment function takes the following form: 
    
(1) 
  
where i  is the country, t  is the time period (years), LS  is the labour income share of 
country i  at time t , P  is the profitability of NFCs of country i  at time t , D  is the corporate 
debt of NFCs of country i  at time t , CC  is the cost of capital of country i  at time t , CS  is the 
corporate savings of NFCs of country i  at time t , OG  is the output growth of country i  at time 
t , FR  are financial receipts of NFCs of country i  at time t  and FP  are financial payments of 
NFCs of country i  at time t . 
The two-way error term component is given by: 
 
 (2) 
 
where ih  accounts for unobservable country-specific effects and tl  accounts for time-
specific effects. The term t,ie  is the random disturbance in the regression, varying across 
countries and years. 
We use lagged values for the independent variables because of the time lag between 
investment decisions and the respective capital expenditures (the decision to invest in t  was 
based with information at 1t - ), the role on the formation of investors’ expectations (adaptive 
expectations) and the need to avoid potential problems of simultaneity and reverse causation 
(i.e. endogeneity problems) (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b).4 On the one hand, profits (where 
financial receipts and financial payments are included) of a certain year are only available for 
investments in the following year; on the other, investors only know the lagged values of output 
growth when they make investment decisions.  
We also included the lag of the dependent variable, taking into account the persistence 
degree that is present in the majority of macroeconomic variables. The inclusion of lagged 
investment helps to control for dynamic effects, namely the gestation in time (investment 
projects usually take over one year to be implemented), irreversibility in investment decisions, 
and inertia (higher/lower investment normally leads to higher/lower subsequent investment) 
(Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). This is corroborated by Kopcke and Braunman (2001), who 
confirm that years of high/low investment tend to follow years of high/low investment. In fact, 
there is a ‘path dependency’ of real investment over time, as stated by Tori and Onaran (2015). 
																																								 																				
4 It should be noted that the use of lagged values for the independent variables does not solve by itself 
the potential endogeneity (i.e. dual causality) between financialisation and real investment. However, this 
issue was taken into account in the choice of the respective methodology, as described in the next 
Section.  
+++++= ---- 1t,i41t,i31t,i21t,i10t,i CCDPII bbbbb
t,itit,i elhµ ++=
t,i1t,i81t,i71t,i61t,i5 FPFROGCS µbbbb +++++ ----
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Note also that Ford and Poret (1990) argue that the best determinant of current investment is its 
own past history.  
All NFCs variables (investment, profitability, debt, corporate savings, financial receipts 
and financial payments) are expressed as ratios of the respective gross value added (both the 
numerator and denominator are in volume). This permits the comparison of variables expressed 
in different currencies, making exchange rates unnecessary for conversion to the same currency 
that could skew results due to the respective movements in international financial markets. This 
also allows the respective coefficients to be interpreted in percentage points (p.p.). 
It should be noted that we propose to estimate an aggregate investment function, similar 
to Stockhammer (2004), Orhangazi (2008a), van Treeck (2008), Onaran et al. (2011) and 
Barradas and Lagoa (2017). Stockhammer (2004) emphasises that the respective results should 
be analysed with care as we are addressing a macroeconomic issue – i.e. the slowdown of real 
investment – although the theory of NFCs investment decisions is supported by microeconomic 
fundaments. This strategy implies the assumption of a representative corporation. In addition, 
we recognise some limitations to this approach, since the use of an aggregate investment 
function does not reflect different financialisation levels among NFCs or potential 
dissimilarities in the behaviour of NFCs from different countries, sectors, industries, dimensions 
and/or ownerships. Note also that as a panel data econometric analysis estimates an average 
effect of several countries, it does not account for the historical, social and economic 
circumstances responsible for real investment in each country. However, Orhangazi (2008a) 
states that this approach has several advantages, namely by allowing us to look beyond the 
particularities of different NFCs and to identify the main relationships that dominate real 
investment. Here, we follow a macroeconomic perspective to assess whether financialisation 
has been beneficial or prejudicial to real investment in the EU. Thus, if the two channels of 
financialisation are found to have a macroeconomic effect, we cannot determine whether it is 
due to the impact of some corporations/countries or is more generalised across all 
corporations/countries. If we do not find any macroeconomic effect, we cannot exclude that 
they affect a subset of corporations/countries, which, however, is not enough to create a 
macroeconomic effect in all countries. 
Accordingly, lagged investment, profitability, corporate savings and output growth are 
expected to exert a positive influence on investment, while cost of capital and financial 
payments are expected to influence NFCs investment negatively. The level of debt and financial 
receipts could have a positive or a negative influence on investment. Thus, coefficients of these 
variables are expected to have the following signs: 
 
(3) 
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Profitability is expected to exert a positive influence on real investment, mirroring the 
demand conditions that are crucial to determine the viability of investment projects. Following a 
Keynesian argument, profitability tends to have a positive effect on real investment by 
functioning as a source of internal funds (Stockhammer, 2004). Kopcke and Braunman (2001) 
note that expectations for future demand conditions and future profitability have the strongest 
influence on investment. Nonetheless, Kuh and Meyer (1955) and Minsky (1975) state that 
given the uncertainty about the future, it is the past demand conditions and past profitability 
rather than the expectations that are the major influencers of investment. This seems to prevent 
the anticipation of future demand conditions and future levels of profitably, in a context where 
these expectations are normally formed on the basis of past.  
The debt level has an undetermined effect on investment (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). 
A positive effect is expected when the debt level is perceived to be safe. Here, a rise in debt may 
have no effect or even a positive effect on investment by increasing the available funds. A 
negative effect occurs when the debt level is perceived to be unsafe, as it signals greater 
financial fragility and makes it more difficult to obtain further funding. In that situation, future 
profits may be insufficient to repay existing debt, increasing the probability of bankruptcy. 
The cost of capital (normally measured by the level of real long-term interest rates) is 
expected to exert a negative effect on real investment, reflecting the funding costs or the 
respective opportunity costs.   
In addition, real investment is expected to depend positively on the respective corporate 
savings, because a higher level of corporate savings tends to be associated with a higher level of 
retained profits, which is necessary to support real investments. The internal means of finance 
rests on the ‘principle of increasing risk’ (Kalecki, 1937). This means that corporations, in 
imperfectly competitive financial markets, need their own funding sources to attract external 
capital in terms of credit, bonds or equity issues for investment purposes. In addition, this also 
means that corporations also constrain the utilisation of external capital for investment purposes 
to minimise the risk of illiquidity and insolvency. On the other hand, the internal means of 
finance support real investment due to the ‘financial hierarchy’, according to which internal 
funding has a cost advantage over external funding (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
On the other hand, real investment also depends positively on the output growth. This 
follows the Keynesian argument of the ‘accelerator principle’, that most investors exhibit a 
higher propensity to invest in periods of economic growth than during downturns, since these 
periods are commonly associated with a higher demand. The ‘accelerator principle’ postulates 
that an acceleration/deceleration of the GDP will accelerate/decelerate real investment, given a 
multiplier higher than zero. Lopes (2003) confirms that real investment in the EU and the USA 
is strongly procyclical in relation to the respective business cycle. Indeed, Sørensen and Whitta-
Jacobsen (2005) highlight the existence of two stylised facts of business cycles in relation to 
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investment: investment is strongly positively correlated with the business cycle and it is the 
most volatile component of aggregate demand.  
Finally, and as discussed in the previous Section, financial receipts have an 
undetermined effect on real investment, given the dual role as a source of funding in the 
function of the NFCs’ dimension. Financial payments tend to lower real investment because 
they reduce the funds available for these real investments. 
 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY: THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
 4.1. DATA 
 In order to analyse the role of financialisation in real investment of EU countries, we 
collect annual data from 1995 to 2013 for a set of 27 countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Malta was the only EU 
country excluded, due to the lack of data. Table 1 shows the sample period and the number of 
observations and missing per country.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
This is the period and the frequency for which all data are available and they are 
suitable for the study for two reasons. Firstly, financialisation became more preponderant in the 
1990s (van der Zwan, 2014); secondly, the investment by corporations is a long-term decision 
(it usually takes over a year to implement investment projects and recover the invested capital), 
and therefore annual data are likely to capture the determinants of real investment better than 
higher frequency data. 
Thus, we constructed a panel of data (or longitudinal data), since we collected data for a 
set of 27 cross-sectional units ( 27N = ) that were observed over time between 1995 and 2013         
( 19T = ). Nonetheless, we obtained unbalanced panel data because it was impossible to collect 
data for all years for each country. We have 64 missing values and our sample is therefore 
composed of a total of 449 observations.  
Table A1 in Appendix contains the descriptive statistics of the data and Table 2 presents 
the corresponding correlation matrix between all variables. The most important finding is that 
the absolute values of all correlations are lower than 0.8, which is crucial to exclude the 
existence of severe multicollinearity between the variables of our model (Studenmund, 2005). 
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In addition, profitability, corporate savings and output growth are the only variables positively 
correlated with investment; indeed they are precisely the three variables expected to have a 
positive effect on investment. The variables of debt, cost of capital, financial receipts and 
financial payments are negatively correlated with investment, which could signal a negative 
effect on investment. This also seems to confirm our suspicion that financialisation has 
hampered real investment through the two aforementioned channels.  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
 Regarding the definition of the data, we used the gross fixed capital formation of NFCs 
divided by the respective gross value added to describe the NFCs’ investment. The ratio 
between these two variables is usually known as the NFCs’ investment rate.  
We used the NFCs’ gross operating surplus5 divided by the respective gross value added 
as a proxy of profitability; the ratio between these two variables is commonly referred to as the 
profit share of NFCs.  
In order to measure the corporate savings, we used the gross savings of NFCs divided 
by the respective gross value added.  
Financial receipts correspond to the sum of interest and the distributed income of 
corporations6 (where dividends are included) received by NFCs. We divided them by the gross 
value added of NFCs.  
We used the sum of interest and the distributed income of corporations (where 
dividends are included) paid by NFCs as a proxy of financial payments. We also divided them 
by the gross value added of NFCs.  
Note that the variables of gross fixed capital formation, gross value added, gross 
operating surplus, gross savings, financial receipts and financial payments of NFCs were 
collected from the European sector accounts (at current prices and in millions of national 
currency), available at Eurostat. When not available on Eurostat, observations of these variables 
																																								 																				
5 According to Eurostat, ‘gross operating surplus can be defined in the context of national accounts as a 
balancing item in the generation of income account representing the excess amount of money generated 
by incorporated enterprises' operating activities after paying labour input costs. In other words, it is the 
capital available to financial and non-financial corporations which allows them to repay their creditors, to 
pay taxes and eventually to finance all or part of their investment’. 
	
6 The distributed income of corporations includes dividends and withdrawals from the income of quasi-
corporations (amounts that entrepreneurs withdraw for their own use from the profits earned by the 
quasi-corporations that belong to them). 
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were completed with data from the sector accounts of the national statistic offices of each 
country.7 
The proxy of the debt level used here was the total financial liabilities of NFCs divided 
by the respective gross value added. The total financial liabilities of NFCs were collected from 
the European financial accounts (at current prices and in millions of national currency), 
available at Eurostat. When not available on Eurostat, observations of these variables were 
completed with data from the financial accounts of the central banks of each country.8 
We used the long-term real interest rates (deflated by the GDP deflator) from the 
AMECO database to measure the cost of capital of NFCs. For some countries, we also used the 
short-term real interest rates (deflated by the GDP deflator) for several years (Bulgaria for 2000 
and 2001; Czech Republic from 1995 to 2000; Estonia for 1996, 1997, 2011, 2012 and 2013; 
Hungary from 1995 to 1998; Lithuania for 1999 and 2000; Norway for 2011 and 2012; 
Romania from 1998 to 2005; Slovakia from 1995 to 1999; and Slovenia for 2001), because in 
the case of these countries, long-term real interest rates are not available for all years.9 We chose 
this strategy instead of using only the short-term real interest rates for all countries because 
investment is a long-term decision and is therefore more dependent on long-term interest rates. 
Thus, this variable contains 414 observations with long-term real interest rates, which contrasts 
with only 35 observations with short-term real interest rates. 
Finally, we applied the usual variable of gross domestic product to describe the 
evolution of output growth. This was collected from European national accounts, available at 
Eurostat (at current prices and in millions of national currency), and was deflated using the GDP 
deflator (2005=100), available on the AMECO database. After that, we calculated the respective 
annual growth rate.  
 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
 As we have a dynamic panel data model, due to the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable among the independent variables, we cannot use the traditional panel data estimators 
(e.g. pooled ordinary least squares, least squares dummy variables, fixed-effects, random-
effects) since they are biased and/or inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable is 
																																								 																				
7 Despite the use of different sources, we confirm that variables are fully comparable because they 
present the same figures for the years where they are simultaneously available at Eurostat and in the 
national statistic offices of each country.  
 
8 Despite the use of different sources, we confirm that variables are fully comparable because they 
present the same figures for the years where they are simultaneously available at Eurostat and in the 
central banks of each country. 
 
9 According to the AMECO database, the real interest rates are obtained by the difference between the 
nominal interest rates and the inflation rate measured by the GDP deflator.	
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correlated with fixed effects in the error term (Nickel, 1981; Baltagi, 2005; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009; among others).  
Accordingly, there are three main different approaches to deal with dynamic panel data. 
Firstly, we can take the first differences of our model, as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982). This instrumental variables (IV) approach removes the constant term and the individual 
effects and produces consistent estimates. However, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Ahn and 
Schmidt (1995) and Baltagi (2005) stress that this methodology does not produce necessarily 
efficient estimates because it does not use all available moment conditions. Secondly, we can 
perform a generalised method of moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982), following the estimator 
proposed by Arrelano and Bond (1991). This estimator is also based on the first differences of 
our model (‘difference GMM’), albeit using a large set of instruments, and is therefore more 
efficient than the former. However, Roodman (2009) claims that this estimator has a weakness, 
namely magnifying gaps in the case of unbalanced panels, which is our case. Thirdly, we can 
implement the estimator proposed by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), which allows the introduction of more instruments (not only the lagged levels, but also 
lagged differences), thus improving its efficiency (‘system GMM’). This estimator subtracts the 
average of all future observations of a certain variable (‘forward orthogonal deviations’ or 
‘orthogonal deviations’) instead of subtracting the previous observation from the 
contemporaneous one (‘first-difference transformation’ of Arrelano and Bond, 1991). Therefore, 
this estimator tends to minimise data loss in the case of unbalanced panels by using the 
aforementioned ‘orthogonal’ transformation (Roodman, 2009). 
Nevertheless, these three estimators have proved to be severely biased and imprecise in 
macro panels where the cross-sectional dimension N  is relatively small (Bruno, 2005a and 
2005b), which is our case. Therefore, they are not appropriate to carry out our estimates. 
Against this backdrop, we will rely on the least squares dummy variables bias corrected 
(LSDVBC),10 introduced by Nickel (1981), Kiviet (1995) and Bun and Kiviet (2003), which 
was extended by Bruno (2005a and 2005b) for unbalanced panels. Note that Monte Carlo 
evidence has shown that this estimator outperforms the IV-GMM estimators in terms of bias 
and root mean squared error (efficiency) when we are in the presence of macro panels (Kiviet, 
1995; Judson and Owen, 1999; and Bruno, 2005a and 2005b). Additionally, Monte Carlo 
evidence has also revealed the good performance of this estimator in terms of bias and 
efficiency even when we have endogenous variables among the independent variables (Behr, 
2003), which could be our case with regard to the variables linked to financialisation.  
																																								 																				
10 We follow the “xtlsdvc” instruction from Stata software. 
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Therefore, we will use the LSDVBC estimator for our investment function.11 This 
estimator works in two steps (Bruno, 2005a and 2005b). Firstly, it generates the consistent 
estimates, which requires the definition of an initial matrix of starting values that can be 
performed using three different consistent estimators (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arrelano and 
Bond, 1991; and Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, the choice of one of these three 
estimators has only a marginal impact on the LSDVBC estimates (Bun and Kiviet, 2001; and 
Bruno, 2005a and 2005b). Secondly, it corrects the bias by undertaking a set of multiple 
replications to bootstrap the standard errors.  
In the next Section, we analyse the estimations of our investment equation for EU 
countries and make some robustness analyses in order to assess whether the results exhibit some 
sensitivity to other specifications and/or sub-samples. In all of the specifications, we use the 
Arrelano and Bond estimator to initialise the LSDVBC estimator and a number of replications 
equal to 250. Time dummies are included in all specifications, as well as a WALD test to assess 
the joint significance of them all.  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This Section presents our estimates. We start by estimating our baseline investment 
function, as specified in Section 3 (Model I). Then, and to obtain a better understanding of the 
effects of financialisation on real investment in EU countries, we re-estimate the investment 
function, splitting financial receipts into interest and dividends receipts ( IR  and DR , 
respectively) and dividing financial payments into interest and dividends payments ( IP  and 
DP , respectively) (Model II). We still re-estimate the investment function in order to assess the 
global net effect of financialisation, through the difference between financial payments and 
financial receipts – net financial payments ( NFP ), on investment (Model III). Finally, we re-
estimate the investment function taking into account the net effects of both channels, i.e. the 
difference between interest payments and interest receipts – net interest payments (NIP ) – and 
																																								 																				
11 Note that we assume the stationarity of our data for the following three reasons. Firstly, plots of our 
eight variables (Figure A1 to Figure A8 in the Appendix) already seem to indicate that all variables are 
stationary in levels. Secondly, our variables are in fact defined in ratios (in the case of investment, 
profitability, debt, corporate savings, financial receipts and financial payments) or in growth rates (in the 
case of output growth); intuitively, it is plausible to assume that these variables do not exhibit a unit root. 
Thirdly, the traditional panel unit root tests have low power and perform very poorly in the presence of 
panels where the cross-sectional dimension N  is higher than the period dimension T , as recognised by 
Baltagi (2005), Hlouskova and Wagner (2006), Cameron and Trivedi (2009), among others. These authors 
also emphasise that for small T , there is the potential risk of concluding that the whole panel is non-
stationary even when the panel has a large proportion of stationary data, since the conventional panel unit 
root tests tend to assume that ¥®T . These are the reasons why we do not perform panel unit root 
tests. 	
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the difference between dividends payments and dividends receipts – net dividends payments      
(NDP ), on productive investment (Model IV). The respective results are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
  
In relation to Model I, all variables are statistically significant at the conventional 
significance levels, with the exceptions of profitability and debt. On the other hand, all 
coefficients of the statistically significant variables have the expected signs, with the exception 
of corporate savings. In fact, NFCs’ investment is negatively influenced by corporate savings, 
which may suggest that internal means of finance are used for other purposes (e.g. to constitute 
reserves or even to finance financial investments) rather than to implement new real projects. 
This could be explained by the strong reduction in external funding costs (visible in the fall of 
real interest rates) in the majority of EU countries since the mid-1990s (Figure A4 in 
Appendix), confirming that the cost advantage of internal funding over external funding was not 
so significant during that time. This result does not confirm the ‘principle of increasing risk’ 
(Kalecki, 1937). The non-significance of profitability and the negative impact of corporate 
savings on investment appear to be consistent with the ‘profit without investment’ hypothesis 
(Stockhammer, 2005). As expected, the lagged investment and output growth exert a positive 
influence and the cost of capital negatively influences real investment.12 These results are 
corroborated by the literature, namely by confirming that the lagged investment is a strong 
determinant of current investment (Ford and Poret, 1990) and that investment is strongly 
procyclical in relation to output growth (Lopes, 2003; and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005). This is also 
in line with Keynesian predictions, according to which demand is a key determinant of 
investment. In the same vein, the ‘accelerator principle’ is confirmed, since coefficients of 
output growth are always higher than zero. Financial receipts exert a positive influence on real 
investment, which seems to exclude the ‘crowding out’ effect. This positive relationship reveals 
that financial investments have not been detrimental to real investments, probably because 
NFCs use financial returns to finance real investments. This is a relatively expected result, 
taking into account that the structure of the European productive system is characterised 
essentially by small and medium-sized corporations.13 These corporations face higher financing 
constraints in comparison with large corporations, being more dependent on financial receipts to 
make new real investments. This result has essentially been found in studies that use micro-data 
at the corporation level, where the effect of financial receipts on investment in the case of small 
																																								 																				
12 Note that results do not change dramatically (in terms of statistical significance and signs) if we had 
excluded observations with short-term real interest rates. Results available upon request.  
 
13 According to European Commission, small and medium-sized corporations are the backbone of the EU, 
representing 99 per cent of all business (https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes_en). 
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and medium-sized corporations is regularly positive (Orhangazi, 2008b; and Tori and Onaran, 
2015). Finally, real investment is negatively influenced by financial payments in line with the 
literature on financialisation. This is a quite common result in similar studies on the relationship 
between financialisation and investment for other economies and/or periods (Stockhammer, 
2004; Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; Van Treeck, 2008; Onaran et al., 2011; Tori and Onaran, 
2015; and Barradas and Lagoa, 2017).  
With regard to Model II, results do not change dramatically, with the exception of 
profitability that becomes statistically significant, exerting a positive effect on real investment. 
Financial receipts maintain their positive influence on real investment, but only dividends 
receipts are statistically significant. This suggests that not all financial investments are 
beneficial to real investments, in a context where returns from shares (dividends) seem to be 
more decisive in real investment than returns from deposits and/or from debt securities 
(interest). Both interest and dividends payments continue to exert a negative influence on real 
investment, but only the former is statistically significant. This seems to illustrate that the debt 
service have been more harmful for real investment than the paradigm of ‘shareholder value 
orientation’. In fact, the literature regards the majority of EU countries as latecomers in the 
development of ‘shareholder value orientation’, in a context where this paradigm is still a recent 
phenomenon among these countries (Barker, 2010). Despite a certain convergence with Anglo-
Saxon countries since the mid-1990s, the author stresses that NFCs of EU countries follow a 
business strategy that is still broadly focused on the achievement of the interests of stakeholders 
rather than the pure maximisation of shareholder interests. A similar conclusion was already 
reported by Stockhammer (2004) to justify the insignificant effect of financialisation on real 
investment in Germany.  
Regarding Model III, results are quite similar in comparison with the other two models. 
Here, profitability loses its statistical significance. Net financial payments are statistically 
significant and represent a negative determinant for real investment. This indicates that the 
beneficial role of financial receipts does not compensate for the prejudicial effect of financial 
payments, stressing that the global effect of financialisation in EU countries is harmful to real 
investment. Indeed, all countries exhibit a higher level of financial payments vis-à-vis financial 
receipts (Figure A7 and Figure A8 in Appendix).  
From Model IV, we conclude that both net interest payments and net dividend payments 
are negative, but only the former are statistically significant. This finding illustrates that the 
global and harmful effect of financialisation on productive investment is caused essentially by 
interest payments due to the debt service rather than by dividends payments due to the recent 
emergence of shareholder-oriented NFCs in EU countries. Despite the non-significance of debt 
in the explanation of investment, the negative impact of net interest payments represents an 
indirect effect as the NFCs’ indebtedness can be prejudicial to real investments. Indeed, this 
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effect represents an important fragility of NFCs and a strong constraint to boost the real 
investment in EU countries, in a context where the high level of the NFCs’ indebtedness and the 
debt service increases the vulnerability of NFCs to interest rate shocks. Real investment is 
affected simultaneously by the price of debt (cost of capital) and by the volume of debt and the 
corresponding debt service (interest payments).  
Now, we evaluate the robustness of our results. Firstly, we re-estimate the four 
specifications of the investment function, excluding the recent years of deep economic crisis. 
Note that output growth, financial receipts and financial payments exhibit a strong decline in 
2008 in the majority of countries of the EU (Figure A6, Figure A7 and Figure A8 in Appendix). 
However, as we have a dynamic panel model explaining the current investment through the 
lagged values of the remaining variables, we only exclude the years after 2009.14 Results are 
exhibited in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
 Overall, results do not change significantly. The most important changes are 
profitability and debt, which become statistically significant in all four models, both positively 
influencing real investment. The cost of capital loses its statistical significance, albeit 
maintaining a negative coefficient.15 Financial receipts and financial payments maintain their 
statistical significance and their positive and negative coefficients, respectively. However, 
interest receipts and dividends payments are now also statistically significant with a positive and 
negative coefficient, respectively. This suggests that all financial investments by NFCs were 
beneficial to the real investments in the pre-crisis period and that the debt service and the 
philosophy of ‘shareholder value orientation’ were both prejudicial. The global net effect of 
financialisation continues to exert a negative impact on real investment. However, the respective 
coefficients are more than double compared with the same coefficients in the full period, 
suggesting that the deleterious effects of financialisation were more pronounced in the pre-crisis 
period. Indeed, an interaction of a dummy variable for the years of crisis (2009-2013) with the 
global net effects of financialisation reveals that during these years these negative effects were 
smoother but not sufficient to cancel them in full.16 This is also reported by Tori and Onaran 
(2015), who reiterate that the negative effects of financialisation on investment were stronger in 
the pre-crisis period. 
																																								 																				
14 Note that results are quite similar if we exclude the years after 2008 instead of the years after 2009. 
Results available upon request.   
 
15  Once again, results do not change greatly if we had excluded observations with short-term real interest 
rates. Results available upon request.  
 
16 Results available upon request. 
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Secondly, we re-estimate the four specifications of the investment function excluding 
some countries that are outliers in order to avoid strongly biased estimates. We apply the 
traditional strategy in two steps in order to detect outliers (Chirinko et al., 1999; and Orhangazi, 
2008b). We begin by calculating the average of each country in relation to all independent 
variables. Then, countries whose averages lie in the one per cent or the 99 per cent tail of 
distribution of these variables were excluded.17 Following this approach, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden were declined. Results without these countries are 
presented in Table 5.  
 
 [Table 5 around here] 
 
Once again, results do not suffer considerable alteration. Nevertheless, the cost of 
capital loses its statistical significance in all models albeit maintaining a negative coefficient, as 
opposed to the level of debt, which gains statistical significance in all models, exerting a 
marginal positive effect on investment.18 Financial receipts maintain a positive significant 
impact on investment, whilst financial payments maintain their negative significant impact. The 
global net effect of financialisation (through net interest payments and net dividends payments, 
respectively) continues to influence real investment negatively, albeit with a higher magnitude 
in comparison to results for all countries. This can reveal that the prejudicial effects of 
financialisation are worse in the remaining countries than in the outlier countries. This 
conclusion is supported by a dummy interaction for outlier countries with the global net effects 
of financialisation. This interaction proved to be positive and statistically significant, reinforcing 
that in these countries the negative effects are not so strong.19  
These previous analyses seem to confirm that our results are relatively robust to the 
presence of both years of crisis and outlier countries, mainly with regard to the impact of 
financialisation on real investment. This conclusion is reinforced if we exclude simultaneously 
years of crisis and outlier countries, as demonstrated in Table 6. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
  
																																								 																				
17 As pointed out by Chirinko et al. (1999), Greene (2000) and Orhangazi (2008b), we do not take into 
account outliers in relation to the dependent variable in order to avoid a censored regression bias. 
Anyhow, the average of all countries with regard to the dependent variable falls between one per cent and 
99 per cent of the distribution, which suggests that there is not any outlier in relation to the dependent 
variable. 
	
18 Note that results would be quite similar excluding observations with short-term real interest rates. Here, 
the most important change is related with the variable of financial receipts that loses its statistical 
significance, albeit maintaining a positive coefficient. Results available upon request.  
 
19 Results available upon request. 	
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Here, the most important finding is related to the global net effect of financialisation, 
which remains as a negative and significant determinant of real investment, albeit with a higher 
intensity. Effectively, the respective coefficient is around the triple comparing with the same 
coefficient for all years/countries, which confirms our previous results that effects of 
financialisation on real investment are worse for the full period and all countries.  
Our next aim is to assess whether financialisation has affected different countries in the 
same manner and/or the same degree, taking into account the heterogeneity existing within EU 
countries in relation to three different characteristics shared between them, namely the type of 
financial system (‘market-based’ and ‘bank-based’ countries)20, their presence in the euro area 
(euro area and non-euro area countries) and their model/variety of capitalism (‘liberal market 
countries’, ‘coordinated market countries’, ‘hybrid/mixed market countries’ and ‘transition 
countries’). In all cases, we create dummy variables and interact them with the global net effect 
of financialisation (Model III) in order to determine whether there is any relationship between 
the effect of financialisation on real investment and these specific characteristics of countries.21 
Against this backdrop, six dummy variables were created. Firstly, we created a dummy variable 
to reflect ‘market-based’ countries ( BasedMarketD - ).
22  Secondly, we constructed a dummy variable 
to take into account euro area countries ( AreaEuroD ).23 Thirdly, four further dummy variables 
were constructed translating the model/variety of capitalism of each country 
( LiberalD , dCoordinateD , HybridD  and TransitionD ).
24 Results of these interactions are illustrated from 
Table 7 to Table 12. 
																																								 																				
20 As advocated by Cingolani (2013), Sawyer (2013) and Botta et al. (2015), we recognise that the 
dichotomy between ‘market-based’ and ‘bank-based’ is objectionable by underestimating other important 
particularities in the functioning of financial system (e.g. types of banks and/or the role of banks in the 
money creation process). Here, we use this distinction because this is the traditional way presented by the 
literature of clustering different countries in terms of their financial systems.  
 
21 These analyses are carried out through dummy interactions instead of sub-samples re-estimations in 
order to avoid dealing with quite small sub-panels.   
	
22 BasedMarketD -  takes the value 1 for Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom; and the value 0 for the remaining countries. The distinction between ‘market-based’ and ‘bank-
based’ countries were made following Bijlsman and Zwart (2013) and Haan et al. (2015). 
	
23 AreaEuroD  takes the value 1 for Austria (after 1998), Belgium (after 1998), Cyprus (after 2008), Estonia 
(after 2010), Finland (after 1998), France (after 1998), Germany (after 1998), Greece (after 2000), 
Ireland (after 1998), Italy (after 1998), Luxembourg (after 1998), Netherlands (after 1998), Portugal 
(after 1998), Slovakia (after 2008), Slovenia (after 2006) and Spain (after 1998); and the value 0 for the 
remaining years and countries. 
	
24 LiberalD  takes the value 1 for Ireland and the United Kingdom; and the value 0 for the remaining 
countries. dCoordinateD  takes the value 1 for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden; and the value 0 for the remaining countries. HybridD  takes the value 1 
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[Table 7 around here] 
 
[Table 8 around here] 
 
[Table 9 around here] 
 
[Table 10 around here] 
 
[Table 11 around here] 
 
[Table 12 around here] 
 
We do not find any statistically significant difference in relation to the impact of 
financialisation on real investment according to the type of financial system. This result is 
consistent with the literature, according to which both financial systems have proved to be 
supporters of financialisation and give a weak boost to investment (Sawyer, 2015). In fact, 
Levine (2002) has already concluded that neither ‘market-based’ nor ‘bank-based’ financial 
systems are particularly effective at promoting economic growth. In relation to the interaction 
for the euro area countries, the respective coefficient is only statistically significant in the pre-
crisis period and without outlier countries. In the remaining three cases, it is almost significant 
at the ten per cent significance level. However, the coefficient is positive in all four cases, which 
gives a tenuous indication that the negative impact of financialisation in the euro area countries 
could be less. Moreover, in all four cases the positive coefficient of the interacted term is not 
sufficient to compensate the negative coefficient of the non-interacted term, confirming that 
financialisation also exerts a negative impact (albeit smoother) in the euro area countries. 
Finally, and regarding the model/variety of capitalism, we do not find any statistically 
significant difference on the effects of financialisation. In general terms, this analysis shows us 
that there are not significant differences on the impact of financialisation by different groups of 
countries, which reflects that EU countries are all negative affected in the same intensity despite 
their institutional differences.  
Finally, we present the economic significance of our statistically significant estimates 
(McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996; and Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004) for Model I and Model III and 
for the full period and for pre-crisis period. This allows us to identify to what extent 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
for Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; and the value 0 for the remaining countries. 
TransitionD  takes the value 1 for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; and the value 0 for the remaining countries. The distribution of countries 
according to their model/variety of capitalism was done taking into account the seminal contribution of 
Hall and Soskice (2001) and other related works in the field of comparative political economy. 	
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financialisation could explain the slowdown of real investment in EU countries since 1995. 
Results are available in Table 13 and Table 14.  
 
[Table 13 around here] 
 
[Table 14 around here] 
  
In the period from 1995 and 2013, cost of capital was the main driver of investment 
rate, whilst output growth had the worst impact. In fact, the fall in real interest rate favoured an 
acceleration in investment rate by around 16-17 per cent. The slowdown of output contributed 
to a decline in investment rate by about 19-20 per cent. The decrease in financial receipts was 
prejudicial to the real investment. The investment rate would have been higher by about four per 
cent if had there not been a fall in the financial receipts. This supports our previous conclusion 
that NFCs of EU countries use returns from financial investments to fund real investment, 
excluding the ‘crowding out’ effect. The decrease in these returns was therefore harmful for real 
investment. This effect did not compensate for the concomitant decline in financial payments, 
which only contributed to an increase of investment rate by about 0.004 per cent. In fact, the 
global net effect of financialisation was marginally negative, being responsible for a decline in 
investment rate by around one per cent. In the pre-crisis period, the global net effects of 
financialisation on real investment were relatively worse. The investment rate would have been 
higher by about eight per cent without an increase in net financial payments. During that time, 
financialisation was the main driver for the slowdown of investment rate.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
  
 This paper aimed determining whether financialisation has beneficial or prejudicial 
effects on real investment in EU countries by conducting a panel data econometric analysis for 
27 EU countries from 1995 and 2013, using macroeconomic annual data. 
As opposed to mainstream economics, the literature on financialisation refers to two 
channels through which the increasing importance of finance could be disruptive to the real 
investment of NFCs. Firstly, the rise in financial investments made by NFCs diverts funds from 
productive investments, causing a type of ‘crowding out’ effect on real investment. Secondly, 
the funds available to support real investments have decreased due to strong pressure from 
shareholders on NFCs for financial payments in the form of interest, dividends and/or stock 
buybacks.  
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We estimate an investment equation to describe real investment using macroeconomic 
annual data through the standard variables (lagged investment, profitability, debt, cost of 
capital, corporate savings and output growth) and two other variables to reflect the two channels 
of financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments). 
As we have a dynamic macro panel, we estimated our investment equation using the 
LSDVBC estimator. We identified financial payments as a negative determinant of real 
investment in EU countries, in accordance with the predictions of the literature on 
financialisation and with other empirical studies around this issue (Stockhammer, 2004; 
Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; Van Treeck, 2008; Onaran et al., 2011; Tori and Onaran, 2015; 
and Barradas and Lagoa, 2017). Both interest and dividend payments negatively influence real 
investment, especially in the pre-crisis period. Nevertheless, financial receipts of dividends exert 
a positive impact on real investment, in contradiction with of the literature on financialisation. 
This seems to illustrate that NFCs in EU countries are using financial incomes to fund real 
investments, which excludes the ‘crowding out’ effect. This can be explained by the large 
number of small and medium-sized corporations in the EU that face high funding constraints 
and therefore use all incomes (even financial) to make new investments. This is a traditional 
result in studies that use micro-data at the corporation level, where the effect of financial 
receipts on investment in the case of small and medium-sized corporations is regularly positive 
(Orhangazi, 2008b; and Tori and Onaran, 2015). However, this positive effect linked to 
financial receipts does not compensate for the negative effect from financial payments. In net 
terms, the process of financialisation has been prejudicial to real investment of NFCs in EU 
countries. 
We also conclude that the prejudicial effects of financialisation on real investment are 
worse in the pre-crisis period. During the pre-crisis period, financialisation was the main driver 
for the slowdown of investment in EU. We do not find any statistically significant difference in 
relation to the impact of financialisation on real investment for ‘market-based’ countries, euro 
area countries, ‘liberal market countries’, ‘coordinated market countries’, ‘hybrid/mixed market 
countries’ and ‘transition countries’. This seems to suggest that the harmful effects of 
financialisation are similar and transversal to all EU countries despite their institutional 
differences.  
Our findings suggest that the prejudicial effects of financialisation on real investment 
are not peculiar to the most developed and financialised economies, such as USA and the UK. 
Instead, it seems to be a generalised phenomenon that negatively affects most EU countries over 
time. 
A possible extension of this work could be the use of different measures to capture the 
two channels of financialisation. The proportion of financial assets to total assets of NFCs and 
the level of payout ratios of NFCs appear to be two interesting alternatives. Concurrently, this 
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paper does not take into account the effects of globalisation on real investment of NFCs, which 
could represent a limitation of our study and a good starting point to perform further research 
around this issue. The idea of this channel is that NFCs from developed countries are increasing 
their external activities in low-wage (developing) countries in order to have lower both 
production costs and taxation and higher profit margins, which also impair the real investment 
at a domestic level (Durand and Gueuder, 2016; and Fiebiger, 2016). Finally, future research on 
this topic should focus on assessing the causes and determinants of financialisation of NFCs of 
EU countries, following the approach developed by Akkemik and Özen (2014) and/or Soener 
(2015). In fact, it seems reasonable to understand first why the NFCs of EU countries are 
financialised in order to derive policy implications that could mitigate these prejudicial effects 
of financialisation on the slowdown of real investment.  
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Figure 1 – The channels associated to the prejudicial effects of financialisation on real investment 
Slowdown of real investment 
Involvement in financial activities 
(more financial receipts) 
Shorter planning horizons 
More concerns about profits 
Falling profits in the real sector 
Increasing external funding costs 
Macroeconomic uncertainty 
Changes in corporate governance 
Mimetic behaviour 
Institutional transmission 
  
Lower retention ratios 
(more financial payments) 
High levels of indebtedness 
Profit-based remunerations 
Importance of institutional investors 
“Shareholder value orientation” 
Source: Authors’ representation based on Orhangazi (2008a and 2008b), Hein and van Treeck (2010), 
Hein (2012), Hein and Dodig (2015), among others 
 
 
Table 1 – Sample composition 
Country Period Observations Missing 
Austria 1995-2013  19 0 
Belgium 1995-2013 19 0 
Bulgaria  2000-2013 14 5 
Cyprus 1997-2013 17 2 
Czech Republic  1995-2013 19 0 
Denmark 1995-2013 19 0 
Estonia 1996-2013 18 1 
Finland 1995-2013 19 0 
France 1995-2013 19 0 
Germany  1995-2013 19 0 
Greece  1996-2013 18 1 
Hungary 1995-2013 19 0 
Ireland 2001-2013 13 6 
Italy 1995-2013 19 0 
Latvia 2004-2013 10 9 
Lithuania 1999-2012 14 5 
Luxembourg 2006-2012 7 12 
Netherlands 1995-2013 19 0 
Norway 1995-2012 18 1 
Poland 2003-2013 11 8 
Portugal 1995-2013 19 0 
Romania 1998-2013 16 3 
Slovakia 1995-2013 19 0 
Slovenia 2001-2013 13 6 
Spain 2000-2013 14 5 
Sweden 1995-2013 19 0 
United Kingdom 1995-2013 19   0 
 
 
Table 2 – The correlation matrix between variables 
 I P D CC CS OG FR FP 
I 1        
P 0.127*** 1       
D -0.253*** -0.209*** 1      
CC -0.195*** -0.001 -0.039 1     
CS 0.295*** 0.228*** -0.307*** 0.066 1    
OG 0.313*** 0.172*** -0.152*** -0.404*** 0.052 1   
FR -0.268*** -0.364*** 0.630*** -0.067 -0.233*** -0.156*** 1  
FP -0.413*** 0.020 0.467*** 0.017 -0.597*** -0.152*** 0.692*** 1 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level  
Table 3 – Estimations of the investment function (1995-2013) 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
It-1 
0.691*** 
(0.040) 
[17.19] 
0.697*** 
(0.040) 
[17.29] 
0.687*** 
(0.040) 
[17.07] 
0.693*** 
(0.040) 
[17.34] 
 
Pt-1 
0.092 
(0.002) 
[1.57] 
0.104* 
(0.060) 
[1.74] 
0.092 
(0.059) 
[1.56] 
0.104* 
(0.059) 
[1.76] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[0.98] 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.03] 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.12] 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.16] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.101*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.68] 
-0.104*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.72] 
-0.098*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.60] 
-0.101*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.65] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.093** 
(0.407) 
[-2.29] 
-0.094** 
(0.042) 
[-2.26] 
-0.099** 
(0.041) 
[-2.43] 
-0.101** 
(0.041) 
[-2.45] 
 
OGt-1 
 
0.109** 
(0.053) 
[2.04] 
0.094* 
(0.056) 
[1.68] 
0.107** 
(0.053) 
[2.01] 
0.093* 
(0.054) 
[1.73] 
 
FRt-1 
0.138** 
(0.066) 
[2.10] 
   
 
IRt-1 
 0.154 
(0.116) 
[1.33] 
  
 
DRt-1 
 0.131* 
(0.076) 
[1.71] 
  
 
FPt-1 
-0.084* 
(0.049) 
[-1.69] 
   
 
IPt-1 
 -0.123* 
(0.074) 
[-1.65] 
  
 
DPt-1 
 -0.070 
(0.054) 
[-1.29] 
  
 
NFPt-1 
  -0.087* 
(0.049) 
[-1.77] 
 
 
NIPt-1 
   -0.130* 
(0.073) 
[-1.77] 
 
NDPt-1 
   -0.074 
(0.053) 
[-1.41] 
Observations 395 395 395 395 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 27 27 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 – Estimations of the investment function (1995-2009) 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
It-1 
0.699*** 
(0.053) 
[13.10] 
0.706*** 
(0.053) 
[13.27] 
0.692*** 
(0.055) 
[12.61] 
0.699*** 
(0.055) 
[12.71] 
 
Pt-1 
0.204*** 
(0.074) 
[2.75] 
0.216*** 
(0.076) 
[2.83] 
0.205*** 
(0.075) 
[2.75] 
0.215*** 
(0.077) 
[2.79] 
 
Dt-1 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
[1.90] 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
[1.88] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.79] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.74] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.091 
(0.056) 
[-1.61] 
-0.094 
(0.059) 
[-1.61] 
-0.077 
(0.057) 
[-1.36] 
-0.081 
(0.059) 
[-1.38] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.108* 
(0.058) 
[-1.84] 
-0.107* 
(0.060) 
[-1.79] 
-0.143** 
(0.057) 
[-2.50] 
-0.142** 
(0.059) 
[-2.43] 
 
OGt-1 
0.122* 
(0.073) 
[1.66] 
0.101 
(0.081) 
[1.25] 
0.091 
(0.073) 
[1.26] 
0.065 
(0.081) 
[0.80] 
 
FRt-1 
0.385*** 
(0.100) 
[3.83] 
   
 
IRt-1 
 
 
 
0.470*** 
(0.173) 
[2.71] 
  
 
DRt-1 
 
 
 
0.353*** 
(0.110) 
[3.20] 
  
 
FPt-1 
-0.225*** 
(0.077) 
[-2.92] 
   
 
IPt-1 
 
 
 
-0.265** 
(0.110) 
[-2.40] 
  
 
DPt-1 
 
 
 
-0.209** 
(0.087) 
[-2.41] 
  
 
NFPt-1 
 
 
 
 -0.218*** 
(0.078) 
[-2.82] 
 
 
NIPt-1 
   -0.254** 
(0.110) 
[-2.30] 
 
NDPt-1 
   -0.198** 
(0.086) 
[-2.29] 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 27 27 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Estimations of the investment function without outlier countries (1995-2013) 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
It-1 
0.647*** 
(0.051) 
[12.57] 
0.654*** 
(0.052) 
[12.51] 
0.644*** 
(0.052) 
[12.45] 
0.654*** 
(0.052) 
[12.49] 
 
Pt-1 
0.100 
(0.073) 
[1.37] 
0.106 
(0.074) 
[1.43] 
0.094 
(0.072) 
[1.31] 
0.105 
(0.073) 
[1.43] 
 
Dt-1 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.79] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.81] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.83] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.82] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.082 
(0.051) 
[-1.61] 
-0.081 
(0.051) 
[-1.60] 
-0.079 
(0.050) 
[-1.59] 
-0.080 
(0.050) 
[-1.61] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.104* 
(0.054) 
[-1.91] 
-0.099* 
(0.056) 
[-1.78] 
-0.105* 
(0.054) 
[-1.95] 
-0.101* 
(0.055) 
[-1.84] 
 
OGt-1 
0.131** 
(0.064) 
[2.06] 
0.112* 
(0.066) 
[1.70] 
0.132** 
(0.064) 
[2.08] 
0.117* 
(0.065) 
[1.81] 
 
FRt-1 
0.189* 
(0.109) 
[1.74] 
   
 
IRt-1 
 0.156 
(0.174) 
[0.90] 
  
 
DRt-1 
 0.207 
(0.135) 
[1.54] 
  
 
FPt-1 
-0.150** 
(0.069) 
[-2.19] 
   
 
IPt-1 
 -0.190** 
(0.096) 
[-1.99] 
  
 
DPt-1 
 -0.140* 
(0.075) 
[-1.88] 
  
 
NFPt-1 
  -0.145** 
(0.068) 
[-2.13] 
 
 
NIPt-1 
   -0.190** 
(0.094) 
[-2.02] 
 
NDPt-1 
   -0.137* 
(0.072) 
[-1.89] 
Observations 306 306 306 306 
Groups (Countries) 21 21 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Estimations of the investment function without outlier countries (1995-2009) 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
It-1 
0.642*** 
(0.061) 
[10.49] 
0.658*** 
(0.061) 
[10.79] 
0.629*** 
(0.062) 
[10.15] 
0.648*** 
(0.062) 
[10.53] 
 
Pt-1 
0.185** 
(0.087) 
[2.11] 
0.192** 
(0.092) 
[2.08] 
0.180** 
(0.087) 
[2.07] 
0.193** 
(0.089) 
[2.17] 
 
Dt-1 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
[2.73] 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
[2.74] 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
[2.80] 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
[2.80] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.070 
(0.063) 
[-1.11] 
-0.072 
(0.064) 
[-1.13] 
-0.059 
(0.062) 
[-0.96] 
-0.064 
(0.062) 
[-1.03] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.097 
(0.070) 
[-1.38] 
-0.090 
(0.072) 
[-1.25] 
-0.108 
(0.068) 
[-1.57] 
-0.097 
(0.069) 
[-1.40] 
 
OGt-1 
0.175* 
(0.092) 
[1.91] 
0.129 
(0.097) 
[1.33] 
0.166* 
(0.092) 
[1.80] 
0.122 
(0.097) 
[1.25] 
 
FRt-1 
0.343** 
(0.150) 
[2.30] 
   
 
IRt-1 
 0.386 
(0.247) 
[1.56] 
  
 
DRt-1 
 0.301* 
(0.180) 
[1.67] 
  
 
FPt-1 
-0.241** 
(0.102) 
[-2.36] 
   
 
IPt-1 
 -0.343** 
(0.142) 
[-2.41] 
  
 
DPt-1 
 -0.195* 
(0.105) 
[-1.84] 
  
 
NFPt-1 
  -0.235** 
(0.102) 
[-2.30] 
 
 
NIPt-1 
   -0.342** 
(0.141) 
[-2.43] 
 
NDPt-1 
   -0.191* 
(0.105) 
[-1.82] 
Observations 224 224 224 224 
Groups (Countries) 21 21 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Estimations of the investment function with a dummy interaction (‘market-based’ countries) 
Variable Model III (1995-2013) 
Model III 
(1995-2009) 
Model III 
(1995-2013 / 
without outliers) 
Model III 
(1995-2009 / 
without outliers) 
 
It-1 
0.687*** 
(0.040) 
[16.99] 
0.690*** 
(0.055) 
[12.60] 
0.644*** 
(0.052) 
[12.36] 
0.628*** 
(0.062) 
[10.12] 
 
Pt-1 
0.090 
(0.059) 
[1.53] 
0.200*** 
(0.075) 
[2.67] 
0.094 
(0.072) 
[1.31] 
0.177** 
(0.087) 
[2.04] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.05] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.77] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.79] 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
[2.74] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.098*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.58] 
-0.075 
(0.057) 
[-1.32] 
-0.079 
(0.050) 
[-1.58] 
-0.058 
(0.062) 
[-0.93] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.097** 
(0.041) 
[-2.39] 
-0.140** 
(0.057) 
[-2.46] 
-0.105* 
(0.054) 
[-1.94] 
-0.103 
(0.068) 
[-1.51] 
 
OGt-1 
0.107** 
(0.053) 
[2.01] 
0.094 
(0.073) 
[1.29] 
0.132** 
(0.064) 
[2.07] 
0.162* 
(0.093) 
[1.75] 
 
NFPt-1 
-0.093* 
(0.052) 
[-1.79] 
-0.228*** 
(0.079) 
[-2.88] 
-0.147** 
(0.070) 
[-2.12] 
-0.247** 
(0.105) 
[-2.34] 
 
DMarket-BasedNFPt-1 
0.074 
(0.152) 
[0.48] 
0.154 
(0.222) 
[0.70] 
0.029 
(0.200) 
[0.15] 
0.256 
(0.320) 
[0.80] 
Observations 395 290 306 224 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 8 – Estimations of the investment function with a dummy interaction (euro area countries) 
Variable Model III (1995-2013) 
Model III 
(1995-2009) 
Model III 
(1995-2013 / 
without outliers) 
Model III 
(1995-2009 / 
without outliers) 
 
It-1 
0.683*** 
(0.041) 
[16.81] 
0.681*** 
(0.055) 
[12.45] 
0.643*** 
(0.052) 
[12.39] 
0.624*** 
(0.062) 
[9.98] 
 
Pt-1 
0.123** 
(0.061) 
[2.01] 
0.243*** 
(0.077) 
[3.16] 
0.130* 
(0.073) 
[1.79] 
0.235*** 
(0.089) 
[2.65] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[0.96] 
0.004 
(0.003) 
[1.51] 
0.004 
(0.003) 
[1.50] 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
[2.27] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.101*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.67] 
-0.086 
(0.057) 
[-1.51] 
-0.080 
(0.050) 
[-1.61] 
-0.069 
(0.061) 
[-1.12] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.106*** 
(0.041) 
[-2.62] 
-0.160*** 
(0.057) 
[-2.78] 
-0.108** 
(0.054) 
[-2.00] 
-0.123* 
(0.067) 
[-1.84] 
 
OGt-1 
0.098* 
(0.054) 
[1.82] 
0.085 
(0.073) 
[1.16] 
0.118* 
(0.064) 
[1.85] 
0.148 
(0.093) 
[1.59] 
 
NFPt-1 
-0.115** 
(0.053) 
[-2.18] 
-0.249*** 
(0.079) 
[-3.16] 
-0.175*** 
(0.068) 
[-2.56] 
-0.275*** 
(0.102) 
[-2.70] 
 
DEuro AreaNFPt-1 
0.050 
(0.032) 
[1.56] 
0.077 
(0.047) 
[1.62] 
0.059 
(0.037) 
[1.61] 
0.109** 
(0.051) 
[2.15] 
Observations 395 290 306 224 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
	
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 9 – Estimations of the investment function with a dummy interaction (‘liberal market countries’) 
Variable Model III (1995-2013) 
Model III 
(1995-2009) 
Model III 
(1995-2013 / 
without outliers) 
Model III 
(1995-2009 / 
without outliers) 
 
It-1 
0.686*** 
(0.040) 
[17.07] 
0.688*** 
(0.055) 
[12.59] 
0.643*** 
(0.052) 
[12.4] 
0.625*** 
(0.062) 
[10.15] 
 
Pt-1 
0.093 
(0.060) 
[1.57] 
0.224*** 
(0.078) 
[2.87] 
0.104 
(0.073) 
[1.43] 
0.205** 
(0.092) 
[2.23] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.14] 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
[1.87] 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
[1.92] 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
[2.89] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.098*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.60] 
-0.074 
(0.057) 
[-1.30] 
-0.078 
(0.049) 
[-1.58] 
-0.054 
(0.062) 
[-0.88] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.100** 
(0.041) 
[-2.40] 
-0.155*** 
(0.059) 
[-2.62] 
-0.113** 
(0.054) 
[-2.08] 
-0.124* 
(0.071) 
[-1.74] 
 
OGt-1 
0.106** 
(0.053) 
[1.99] 
0.088 
(0.073) 
[1.20] 
0.130** 
(0.064) 
[2.03] 
0.162* 
(0.093) 
[1.74] 
 
NFPt-1 
-0.090* 
(0.052) 
[-1.72] 
-0.247*** 
(0.085) 
[-2.91] 
-0.164** 
(0.072) 
[-2.26] 
-0.280** 
(0.115) 
[-2.43] 
 
DLiberalNFPt-1 
0.034 
(0.158) 
[0.22] 
0.195 
(0.215) 
[0.90] 
0.120 
(0.204) 
[0.59] 
0.223 
(0.231) 
[0.96] 
Observations 395 290 306 224 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
 
 
Table 10 – Estimations of the investment function with a dummy interaction (‘coordinated market 
countries’) 
Variable Model III (1995-2013) 
Model III 
(1995-2009) 
Model III 
(1995-2013 / 
without outliers) 
Model III 
(1995-2009 / 
without outliers) 
 
It-1 
0.688*** 
(0.040) 
[17.12] 
0.688*** 
(0.055) 
[12.59] 
0.640*** 
(0.052) 
[12.33] 
0.629*** 
(0.062) 
[10.15] 
 
Pt-1 
0.092 
(0.059) 
[1.56] 
0.204*** 
(0.076) 
[2.72] 
0.100 
(0.073) 
[1.36] 
0.175** 
(0.088) 
[1.98] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.09] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.84] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.88] 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
[2.76] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.096** 
(0.038) 
[-2.50] 
-0.078 
(0.057) 
[-1.33] 
-0.081 
(0.050] 
[-1.64] 
-0.058 
(0.062) 
[-0.93] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.097** 
(0.041) 
[-2.38] 
-0.142** 
(0.0579) 
[-2.36] 
-0.109** 
(0.055) 
[-1.99] 
-0.105 
(0.069) 
[-1.51] 
 
OGt-1 
0.107** 
(0.053) 
[2.01] 
0.093 
(0.073) 
[1.26] 
0.132** 
(0.063) 
[2.08] 
0.167* 
(0.092) 
[1.81] 
 
NFPt-1 
-0.107* 
(0.057) 
[-1.88] 
-0.208** 
(0.085) 
[-2.72] 
-0.140** 
(0.070) 
[-2.01] 
-0.235** 
(0.105) 
[-2.23] 
 
DCoordinatedNFPt-1 
0.061 
(0.092) 
[0.66] 
-0.037 
(0.136) 
[-0.27] 
-0.057 
(0.150) 
[-0.38] 
0.021 
(0.204) 
[0.10] 
Observations 395 290 306 224 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 11 – Estimations of the investment function with a dummy interaction (‘hybrid/mixed market 
countries’) 
Variable Model III (1995-2013) 
Model III 
(1995-2009) 
Model III 
(1995-2013 / 
without outliers) 
Model III 
(1995-2009 / 
without outliers) 
 
It-1 
0.685*** 
(0.041) 
[16.71] 
0.691*** 
(0.055) 
[12.52] 
0.644*** 
(0.052) 
[12.42] 
0.629*** 
(0.062) 
[10.17] 
 
Pt-1 
0.093 
(0.059) 
[1.58] 
0.204*** 
(0.075) 
[2.72] 
0.095 
(0.072) 
[1.32] 
0.180** 
(0.088) 
[2.05] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.12] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.86] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.82] 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
[2.79] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.099*** 
(0.038) 
[-2.61] 
-0.076 
(0.057) 
[-1.32] 
-0.079 
(0.050) 
[-1.59] 
-0.060 
(0.062) 
[-0.97] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.100** 
(0.041) 
[-2.43] 
-0.137** 
(0.059) 
[-2.33] 
-0.107** 
(0.054) 
[-1.97] 
-0.109 
(0.070) 
[-1.56] 
 
OGt-1 
0.107** 
(0.053) 
[2.01] 
0.093 
(0.073) 
[1.27] 
0.131** 
(0.064) 
[2.06] 
0.165* 
(0.093) 
[1.77] 
 
NFPt-1 
-0.078 
(0.058) 
[-1.35] 
-0.236*** 
(0.086) 
[-2.73] 
-0.126 
(0.079) 
[-1.59] 
-0.226** 
(0.105) 
[-2.15] 
 
DHybridNFPt-1 
-0.030 
(0.099) 
[-0.31] 
0.056 
(0.128) 
[0.44] 
-0.062 
(0.120) 
[-0.52] 
-0.030 
(0.151) 
[-0.20] 
Observations 395 290 306 224 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 12 – Estimations of the investment function with a dummy interaction (‘transition countries’) 
Variable Model III (1995-2013) 
Model III 
(1995-2009) 
Model III 
(1995-2013 / 
without outliers) 
Model III 
(1995-2009 / 
without outliers) 
 
It-1 
0.688*** 
(0.041) 
[17.00] 
0.695*** 
(0.054) 
[12.88] 
0.641*** 
(0.052) 
[12.40] 
0.630*** 
(0.061) 
[10.29] 
 
Pt-1 
0.091 
(0.059) 
[1.55] 
0.206*** 
(0.075) 
[2.74] 
0.095 
(0.072) 
[1.32] 
0.179** 
(0.088) 
[2.05] 
 
Dt-1 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[1.12] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.81] 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
[1.84] 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
[2.78] 
 
CCt-1 
-0.095** 
(0.039) 
[-2.47] 
-0.069 
(0.058) 
[-1.20] 
-0.081* 
(0.049) 
[-1.65] 
-0.054 
(0.062) 
[-0.87] 
 
CSt-1 
-0.097** 
(0.041) 
[-2.37] 
-0.139** 
(0.058) 
[-2.43] 
-0.107** 
(0.054) 
[-1.96] 
-0.104 
(0.069) 
[-1.51] 
 
OGt-1 
0.106** 
(0.053) 
[2.00] 
0.093 
(0.073) 
[1.28] 
0.132** 
(0.063) 
[2.08] 
0.168* 
(0.092) 
[1.82] 
 
NFPt-1 
-0.075 
(0.056) 
[-1.35] 
-0.195** 
(0.087) 
[-2.24] 
-0.166** 
(0.084) 
[-1.98] 
-0.207* 
(0.124) 
[-1.67] 
DTransitionNFPt-1 -0.043 
(0.092) 
[-0.46] 
-0.083 
(0.130) 
[-0.64] 
0.048 
(0.108) 
[0.44] 
-0.066 
(0.154) 
[-0.42] 
Observations 395 290 306 224 
Groups (Countries) 27 27 21 21 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Wald Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), z-statistics in [], *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. Coefficients, 
standard errors and z-statistics for the year dummies are not reported 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table 13 – The economic significance of our estimates (Model I) 
Variable 
1995-2013 1995-2009 
Short-term 
Coefficient 
Long-term 
Coefficient 
Actual 
Cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect 
Short-term 
Coefficient 
Long-term 
Coefficient 
Actual 
Cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect 
Pt-1 - - - - 0.204 0.678 0.051 0.035 
Dt-1 - - - - 0.006 0.020 0.405 0.008 
CCt-1 -0.101 -0.327 -0.513 0.168 - - - - 
CSt-1 -0.093 -0.301 0.096 -0.029 -0.108 -0.359 -0.002 0.001 
OGt-1 0.109 0.353 -0.558 -0.197 0.122 0.405 -2.180 -0.883 
FRt-1 0.138 0.447 -0.088 -0.039 0.385 1.279 0.441 0.564 
FPt-1 -0.084 -0.272 -0.016 0.004 -0.225 -0.748 0.240 -0.180 
Note: The long-term coefficient is obtained through the division between the short-term coefficient 
(estimated coefficient) and one minus the coefficient of the autoregressive estimation (estimated lagged 
investment coefficient). The actual cumulative change corresponds to the growth rate of the 
correspondent variable. The economic effect is the multiplication of the long-term coefficient by the 
actual cumulative change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 – The economic significance of our estimates (Model III) 
Variable 
1995-2013 1995-2009 
Short-term 
Coefficient 
Long-term 
Coefficient 
Actual 
Cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect 
Short-term 
Coefficient 
Long-term 
Coefficient 
Actual 
Cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect 
Pt-1 - - - - 0.205 0.666 0.051 0.034 
Dt-1 - - - - 0.005 0.016 0.405 0.006 
CCt-1 -0.098 -0.313 -0.513 0.161 - - - - 
CSt-1 -0.099 -0.316 0.096 -0.030 -0.143 -0.464 -0.002 0.001 
OGt-1 0.107 0.342 -0.558 -0.191 - - - - 
NFPt-1 -0.087 -0.278 0.033 -0.009 -0.218 -0.708 0.107 -0.076 
Note: The long-term coefficient is obtained through the division between the short-term coefficient 
(estimated coefficient) and one minus the coefficient of the autoregressive estimation (estimated lagged 
investment coefficient). The actual cumulative change corresponds to the growth rate of the 
correspondent variable. The economic effect is the multiplication of the long-term coefficient by the 
actual cumulative change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 – The descriptive statistics of the data 
 I P D CC CS OG FR FP 
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
Mean 0.246 0.436 3.794 0.025 0.251 0.024 0.090 0.216 
Median 0.237 0.420 3.495 0.024 0.252 0.028 0.066 0.206 
Maximum 0.578 0.604 16.135 0.245 0.493 0.140 0.637 0.708 
Minimum 0.118 0.280 0.523 -0.130 -0.141 -0.169 0.006 0.043 
Standard Deviation 0.069 0.078 1.687 0.037 0.079 0.036 0.080 0.094 
Skewness 1.031 0.2140 2.431 1.142 -0.661 -1.083 2.588 1.114 
Kurtosis 4.650 2.101 14.972 10.904 5.270 7.432 13.652 5.562 
Figure A1 – The plots of investment (% of gross value added) 
 
 
	
	
Figure A2 – The plots of profitability (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A3 – The plots of debt (% of gross value added) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4 – The plots of cost of capital (%) 
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Figure A5 – The plots of corporate savings (% of gross value added) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6 – The plots of output growth (annual growth rate) 
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Figure A7 – The plots of financial receipts (% of gross value added) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8 – The plots of financial payments (% of gross value added) 
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